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Abstract
Based on an unbalanced panel of all Bavarian cooperative banks for the years of 1989-95
which includes information on 243 mergers, we analyze motives for and cost effects of
small-scale mergers in German banking. Estimating a frontier cost function with a time-
variable stochastic efficiency term we show that positive scale and scope effects from a
merger arise only if the merged unit closes part of the former branch network. When we
compare actual mergers to a simulation of hypothetical mergers, size effects of observed
mergers turn out to be slightly more favorable than for all possible mergers. Banks taken
over by others are less efficient than the average bank in the same size class, but exhibit
on average the same efficiency as the acquiring firms. For the post-merger phase, our
empirical results provide no evidence for efficiency gains from merging, but point instead
to a leveling off of differences among the merging units.
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1 Introduction
Between end of 1990 and 1995 more than 1,400 banks disappeared from the German
banking market. This decline in the number of banks at an annual rate of 5.3% is almost
entirely due to mergers and acquisitions within the industry. Since Germany is still
„over-banked“ compared to other European countries, this tendency towards increasing
concentration can be expected to continue in the near future, albeit at a somewhat
slower rate. From the view of industrial organization as well as from the view of anti-
trust policy, the merger wave can be considered as a huge experiment which enables
economists to observe the complex trade-off between social efficiency losses and cost
efficiency gains. As for the former, increasing concentration tends to strengthen the
market power of the surviving firms, resulting in higher prices for loans and services.
This should be particularly relevant for mergers among the biggest German banks which
were observed for the first time in 1997. As for the latter, large-scale production, a bet-
ter mix of outputs, or enhanced management quality could lead to higher cost efficiency
of merged banks. As Aiginger and Pfaffermayr (1997) have shown for some non-bank-
ing sectors, social benefits from reduced costs may easily offset any social costs of
higher prices and lower output levels.
In this paper we focus our interest on mergers among cooperative banks.1 These banks
which together make up about 70% of all German universal banks are typically small
and are the ones that dominated the merger activities during recent years. More specifi-
cally, we analyze cost effects of mergers among Bavarian cooperative banks, which
represent by far the largest subgroup of the German cooperative banking sector and pro-
vide us with data on 243 mergers between 1989 and 1995. Following Berger and
Humphrey (1992), we differentiate between pre-merger and post-merger cost considera-
tions. As bank managers claim, the most important pre-merger cost incentive for ac-
quiring another bank are size effects, i.e., economies of scale and economies of scope.
Because the magnitude of size effects depends heavily on the extent to which branches
are closed in the post-merger phase (cf. Shaffer, 1993), we simulate a range from no
branch closures to closure of all branches of the acquired bank. Furthermore, we com-
pare size effects from observed mergers to those of all hypothetical mergers (for a simi-
lar approach with regard to hypothetical mega-mergers see Shaffer, 1993, and Altunbas
et al., n.y.). From Berger and Humphrey (1991) and Lang and Welzel (1995) we know
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 Our dataset enables us to always identify an acquiring and an acquired bank. Note, however, that
there are no hostile takeovers in our data which explains why we also use the term „merger“.
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that in banking X-inefficiency tends to be a much more important source of higher costs
than scale inefficiency. We therefore examine differences in the management quality be-
tween acquiring and acquired banks. If the acquiring bank is more X-efficient than the
acquired bank, we interpret this difference as an incentive for merger, the reason being
that additional profit can be created by transferring management skills to the acquired
bank (cf. Berger and Humphrey, 1992). In a post-merger analysis of banking costs, we
quantify the change in X-efficiency after a merger and thereby evaluate whether the
transfer of better management was successful.
So far very little work has been done on bank mergers in Germany. Besides the mimeo-
graphed paper by Altunbas et al. (n.y.) which presents predicted size effects of hypo-
thetical mega-mergers, there is a non-econometric analysis of ex-post performance
based on balance-sheets by Tebroke (1993). In a paper by Vander Vennet (1996) per-
formance effects of mergers and acquisitions for the whole EC region are examined.
Other empirical studies on German banking concentrate on the measurement of econo-
mies of scale and scope and on X-inefficiency and its components (see Lang and Welzel,
1997a, 1997b) and thereby provide some insights into pre-merger incentives, but do not
explicitly consider mergers. It should be noted that a meaningful ex-post analysis of
bank mergers imposes considerable data requirements. For the present study this prob-
lem could be overcome by building an unbalanced panel dataset consisting of seven
years which should be enough time for merged units to adjust to the new situation. Fur-
thermore, a time-varying X-efficiency term can be implemented, which enables us to
more accurately identify management quality at different points in time.
The plan of the paper is as follows: In section 2 we outline our specification of the
banking technology as well as the implementation and measurement of X-efficiency and
size efficiency. Section 3 contains a description of the data and the observed merger
process. In section section 4 we present our empirical results. Section 5 sums up.
2 Methodology
The concept of a cost function lies at the analytical core of our study. Once estimated in
step one of our analysis, the cost function provides us with all information necessary to
determine scale and scope effects of increasing bank size through merging. To allow for
differences in the abilities of bank managers to control costs, we estimate a frontier cost
function using a stochastic X-efficiency term which measures the bank specific dis-
tances from their actual cost positions to the best-practice cost frontier. All firms can be
ranked relative to this frontier, holding constant all exogenous determinants of banking
costs such as output levels and output structure, input prices, or size of the branch
- 3 -
network. The overall cost efficiency of a banking firm is then determined by its size effi-
ciency (output levels and mixture) and by its X-efficiency. In a second step, we use this
information on banking technology and X-efficiency to analyze the merger activities
among cooperative banks.
( )
ln ( , , , ) ln ln
ln ln ln ln
ln ln ln ln ln ln
ln ln
C w y br t a a w b y
a w w g w y
b y y c br c br d w br
e y br f t
kt kt kt kt i ikt
i
m mkt
m
ij ikt jkt
ji
im ikt mkt
mi
mn mkt nkt
nm
kt kt i ikt kt
i
i mkt kt
m
= + +
+ +
+ + + +
+ + +
= =
== ==
== =
=
∑ ∑
∑∑ ∑∑
∑∑ ∑
∑
0
1
3
1
6
1
3
1
3
1
6
1
3
1
6
1
6
0 1
2
1
3
1
6
0
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2 1
2
1
3
1
6
f t g w t h y t ui ikt
i
m mkt
m
kt kt+ + + +
= =
∑ ∑ln ln ν
(1)
To begin with the first step of our analysis, consider the multi-output translog cost
function presented in (1). For each bank k and time period t total costs C are assumed to
depend on the vector of factor prices w, the vector of output levels y, the number of
branches br, and a trend variable t (see section 3 for detailed information on the data).
Technical as well as allocative X-inefficiency is represented by the efficiency variable
u . Finally, to control for measurement error and cost determinants beyond the control of
management, a random term ν  with the usual properties is added.
To ensure symmetry and linear homogeneity in input prices, we impose the following
restrictions:
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As for the specification of the efficiency term ukt , we follow the stochastic frontier ap-
proach originally introduced by Aigner et. al. (1977). To ensure high flexibility and to
make full use of the given information, the Battese and Coelli (1992) model is used,
which allows time-varying X-efficiencies for unbalanced panel data.2 This latter aspect
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 One of the main advantages of a panel is the more accurate prediction of X-efficiency ukt  as the
number of periods is growing. A greater number of observations in a pure cross-sectional sample
does not necessarily reduce the standard error of estimated X-efficiency (cf. Greene, 1993).
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is particularly important in the framework of this paper because the merger activities
over time make a lot of banks disappear from the sample.
Battese and Coelli define the time varying X-efficiency term ukt  for a given panel
length of T periods by ( )[ ]u t T Ukt k= − −exp ( )η . As in most applications of stochastic
frontier analysis, the positive firm effects U k  are assumed to follow a half-normal
distribution, i.e., U k ∼ ( )N u0 2,σ .3 Given the exponential specification of ukt , X-effi-
ciency is increasing, constant, or decreasing over time, if η > 0 , η = 0 , or η < 0 . Note
that η  is assumed to be identical for all banks, leaving U k  to capture efficiency differ-
ences.
Figure 1:
Time-varying inefficiency and merger activity
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Figure 1 provides an illustration of this specification for a 7-year panel and a positive
value of η  which forces efficiency levels to increase over time. In this example, only
Bank A can be observed for all seven years, whereas bank C is acquired by the more
efficient Bank B after period 3. At the end of period 5, the relative inefficient Bank D
acquires unit B. Efficiency differences can therefore easily be measured as the differ-
ence in X-efficiency at the last period before a merger. To allow for X-efficiency conse-
quences of merging, however, the merged unit has to be defined like a new entrant to
the market. Furthermore, the jump to a new efficiency path has to be corrected by the
trend variable η . Because of the cardinal definition of X-efficiency (for details see be-
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 This is actually a slight modification of the approach of Battese and Coelli who assume u to follow
the non-negative truncation of a normal distribution which, however, turned out not to be
numerically robust.
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low), the derivation of merger effects is more sophisticated than in Rhoades (1993) who
defines efficiency quartiles and observes movements between them.
The log-likelihood function of our model can be expressed as (cf. Battese and Coelli,
1992)
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with σ σ συ
2 2 2
= +u , γ σ σ= u2 2 , ( )( )η ηkt t T= − −exp , ( )Φ ⋅ denoting the cumulative
distribution function of the standard normal, and ε υ βkt kt kt kt ktu C x= + = − ′ln . For the
latter expression, all exogenous variables of the cost function (1) are stacked into the
vector xkt . TK  is the number of observations for firm K which may be smaller than T.
The maximum likelihood estimation of this function generates estimates of all parame-
ters of the frontier cost function as well as of σ2 , η  and γ .
After solving the maximum likelihood problem (2), aggregate residuals ε  can be
derived by substituting the estimated parameter vector β  into the cost function (1).
Battese and Coelli (1992) have shown that the following formula can be used to get an
estimate of firm specific efficiency:
( )[ ] ( )( )X EFF ukt kt k
k k kt k
k k
kt k kt k
k k u
k k u
k
u
k k u
− = − =
−
− +




=
−
+
=
+
E exp
/
/
exp
* * *
* *
* *
'
'
*
'
ε
µ σ η σ
µ σ
η µ η σ
µ η ε σ
σ η η σ
σ
σ σ
σ η η σ
υ
υ
υ
Φ
Φ
1
2
2 2
2
2 2
2
2 2
2 2
with
k
*
(3)
Because of the multiplicative relationship in a translog cost function, X EFFkt−  can be
interpreted as cost ratio of a fully efficient bank to the deterministic part of the observed
unit, i.e., ( ) ( )( ) ] ]X EFF x x ukt kt kt kt− = + ∈exp ' / exp ' ,β β 0 1 . A value of one indicates a
frontier firm, whereas a value of, say, 0.8 means that this particular bank could reduce
its costs to a level of 80% of its actual costs.
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A translog cost function is non-homothetic and therefore sufficiently flexible to allow
for a wide range of scale and scope effects. We isolate these size effects of mergers by
comparing the aggregate costs of the individual banks to the costs of the merged unit,
where we set input prices of all banks involved equal to the input prices of the acquiring
firm. In detail, a size-effect measure S EFFA M− ,  which considers scale as well as scope
consequences is constructed as
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Negative values of S EFFA M− ,  indicate a cost advantage of a merger of the (acquiring)
bank A with one or more banks M. Note that w and as y represents a vector of input
prices and output quantities, respectively.
One open question concerns the treatment of the number of branches of the merged
bank in the measure suggested in (4). A whole range from keeping all previous branch
offices - as implicitly assumed in (4) - to closing all branch offices of the acquired bank
in the case of perfect regional overlap seems possible. To separate the impact of scale
and scope effects from the impact of the number of branches on our evaluation of a
merger’s success or failure, S EFFA M− ,  is also calculated in a second version where we
reduce the branch network of the merged unit from br brA M
M
+ ∑  to br A  thereby
assuming post-merger closure of all branches of the acquired unit.
We use the size effect measure not only to examine mergers which actually happened
but also to make predictions about hypothetical mergers. This is of particular relevance
for our study of cooperative banks because these banks are subject to a principle of
regional demarcation which can be expected to prevent them from picking ideal part-
ners. In our analysis we follow Shaffer (1993) and Altunbas et al. (n.y.) and simulate all
possible pairs of bank mergers. All independent banks in the year 1989 are used as em-
pirical basis for these would-be mergers. This amounts to about 430,000 pair-wise
mergers for which we calculate size effects. With regard to the definition of input prices,
we assume the larger bank to be the acquiring firm.
3 Data
We apply the model specified above to the full sample of Bavarian cooperative banks
which cover about 20% of all German universal banks and more than a quarter of the
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cooperative banking segment. Bavarian cooperative banks are of special interest because
of their prominent role in the merger wave: The concentration process started earlier and
has been more intense than in other segments of the German banking industry. We had
access to data from all banks and all mergers of this part of the industry for the period
1989-95, allowing the construction of an unbalanced panel. Information about the num-
ber of banks and the number of mergers is presented in Figure 2.4 Because of some
mergers involving more than two firms, the number of disappearing banks exceeds the
number of merger cases (265 vs 243). The maximum number of banks participating in
one single merger is four. Moreover, to allow for jumps on the efficiency paths as a con-
sequence of merging (recall Figure 1), the merged unit is assumed to represent a new
independent bank. As a result, the total number of firms in our dataset is 1,179 and
therefore larger than the number of independent banks in 1989.
Figure 2:
Number of banks and number of mergers
total number of banks:       1179
total number of observations:    5477
total number of mergers:         243
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A closer look at the merger data in Table 1 shows that - using 1995 prices - more than
60% of all disappearing firms had total assets between 25 and 80 million DM, i.e., were
very small banks. Interestingly, the size of the average disappearing bank did not in-
crease during the observation period. Acquiring banks were spread far more evenly over
size classes, with a maximum density in the range of 100 to 150 million DM of total
assets. For acquiring banks we observe a time trend with average size growing from 150
million DM in 1989 monotonously to 250 million DM in 1995. Consequently, the per-
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 Information on the distribution of observations over size classes can be found in the Appendix.
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centage growth because of mergers has been declining over time. Apart from a few ex-
ceptions, the acquiring bank was - measured in terms of total assets - bigger than the ac-
quired institution.
Table 1:
Numbers of mergers by size, 1989-1995
Total assets of disappearing institution (million DM)
0-25 25-
40
40-
60
60-
80
80-
100
100-
150
150-
200
200-
250
250-
350
>35
0
Total
0-25 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
25-40 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
40-60 1 6 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9
Total assets 60-80 1 2 11 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 20
of acquiring 80-100 0 7 7 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 20
institution 100-150 6 8 17 10 8 9 1 0 0 0 59
(million 150-200 1 12 9 7 2 10 2 0 0 0 43
DM) 200-250 1 2 8 1 5 4 4 0 0 0 25
250-350 1 6 7 6 5 8 1 1 1 0 36
>350 0 5 8 8 6 8 8 2 2 3 50
Total 12 49 69 45 26 39 16 3 3 3 265
Total assets in 1995 prices
The estimation of the cost function (1) is based on information of the complete unbal-
anced panel, i.e., is 5,477 observations for 1,179 banks. Every observation corresponds
to one year. As for the definition of inputs and outputs of a banking firm, we follow the
majority of the literature and rely on the „intermediation approach“ (cf. Sealey and
Lindley, 1977). Within this framework, deposits are treated as inputs and loans as out-
puts. Total costs therefore consist of operating and interest costs, the former being de-
fined as costs of labor and physical capital. Table 2 gives the minimum, maximum,
mean values and the standard deviations in our dataset.
Input quantities are measured by the annual average of the number of employees, the
value of fixed assets in the balance sheet, and the volume of deposits both from non-
banks and banks, respectively. Factor prices for labor ( w1 ) and deposits ( w3 ) are calcu-
lated in a straightforward way by dividing expenses through input quantities. For the
price of physical capital we draw upon the concept of user-costs: A price w2  of capital
is generated as sum of a bank’s depreciation rate5 and its opportunity cost. The former
can be inferred from the balance sheet and the income statement. As for the latter, we
use the firm-specific interest rate for loans less the expected rise in the value of the
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 Depreciation without write-offs for bad loans.
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physical capital employed. We approximate this latter expectation by the growth rate of
the producer price index for investment goods in Germany.
Table 2
Description of the data, 1989-1995
Variable Description Mean Value Standard-
Deviation
Minimum Maximum
total assets (million DM) 184.3 226.7 8.1 3139.0
C total cost (million DM) 11.7 14.3 0.5 192.3
w1 price of labor(thousand DM/employee)
83.6 9.8 28.1 154.9
w2 price of capital (%) 14.6 5.0 3.3 80.4
w3 price of deposits (%) 4.7 0.8 2.5 12.2
x1
volume of labor
(employees)
36.4 40.7 2.0 566.0
x2
volume of physical capital
(fixed assets in million DM)
4.3 5.0 0.02 57.7
x3
volume of deposits
(million DM)
166.8 202.6 13.3 2480.0
y1 short-range loans to non-banks (million DM)
37.8 55.5 0.2 694.5
y 2 long-range loans to non-banks (million DM)
72.9 88.8 1.1 991.8
y3 loans to banks (million DM) 21.2 35.0 0.01 903.8
y 4 bonds, cash, real estateinvestments (million DM)
47.4 64.9 0.9 1496.8
y5 commissions (million DM) 0.9 1.3 0.001 17.3
y6 sales from commodities(million DM)
2.6 4.2 0.001 46.2
br number of branch offices 5.9 5.3 1.0 42.0
Values in 1995-prices; mean values averaged over 1989 to 1995.
The definitions of the output variables are motivated by theoretical considerations, by
the institutional setup of German banking, by examples from the previous literature, and
by limitations of the data we had access to. In particular we consider six outputs
y ii , , ,= 1 6 : short-term loans to non-banks ( y1 ), long-term loans to non-banks ( y 2 ),
interbanking assets ( y3 ), a residual output ( y 4 ), fees and commissions ( y5 ), revenues
from sales of commodities ( y6 ). Long-term loans have a duration of at least four years.
The residual output includes bonds, cash holdings and other assets not covered by loan
outputs y1  to y3 , with bonds covering more than 80% of this variable. Notice that only
share holdings for portfolio purposes were included in this variable which therefore does
not cover investments German banks hold in other firms. Using outputs y5  and y6  goes
beyond the intermediation approach as commonly modeled: Income from fees and
commissions is a proxy variable to capture an important feature of universal banking in
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the German financial sector, namely the fact that banks buy and sell shares and bonds on
behalf of their customers. Revenues from selling commodities, finally, are a specific
characteristic of the cooperative banks which traditionally operate in rural areas and
trade in seeds etc.6 Since about one third of the banks in our sample no longer engage in
these activities, y6  takes the value of zero for these banks which implies that the trans-
log function is not defined. To avoid this problem, we use a substitute value of DM
1,000 in these cases. All other output variables only take strictly positive values for all
banks in the dataset.
4 Results
Table A-1 in the Abstract contains parameter estimates from the numerical maximiza-
tion of the likelihood function (2).7 Apart from the basic model, we also estimated some
alternative specifications in order to test whether a restricted form of the error term or of
the cost function could have been used. Table A-2 presents the likelihood ratio test re-
sults for these models, clearly indicating that the complete model of the cost function
with time-varying efficiency is the most appropriate. With respect to the main focus of
the paper, the most important result is the strong rejection of the hypothesis that a tradi-
tional average cost function as opposed to a frontier function could adequately represent
the data. Furthermore, the hypothesis that efficiency ratios are time-invariant can be
rejected, too. The parameter η  of the exponential function explaining ukt  takes a posi-
tive value, suggesting an increasing trend in bank efficiency.
In a next step, efficiency scores X-EFF were calculated on the basis of equation (3) for
all banks and the full range of observed periods. Average values of these predicted
X-EFF for all 10 size classes are plotted against the year of observation in Figure 3. The
definition of the size classes and some more information about the distribution of
X-EFF is given in Table A-3 in the Appendix. As can be seen, average X-efficiency
turns out to be about 0.92 which provides us with an important benchmark: The average
cooperative bank in Bavaria could reduce total costs -  including expenses on deposits -
by about 8.5% without any adjustments in input prices, output volumes, or the branch-
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 Variables y5  and y6  are the best indicators available for the services involved here. Dropping
these variables would not be appropriate because on average about 18% of total income are
generated from these services. For a similar approach see Sheldon (1994) and Sheldon and
Haegler (1993).
7
 All calculations were run on GAUSS.
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ing network.8 As a consequence of the positive parameter estimate for η , efficiency
scores rise over time, on average from 0.911 in 1989 to 0.926 in 1995. Finally, in terms
of X-efficiency larger banks are somewhat lagging behind their smaller rivals, with this
difference even growing over the observation period.
Figure 3
X-Efficiency by size classes and years
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To analyze actual mergers, we calculate the difference in X-efficiency between an ac-
quiring and an acquired bank and plot them in Figure 4 against the acquiring firm’s
efficiency score.
Figure 4
Ex-ante differences in X-efficiency
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Efficiency difference as X-Efficiency of acquiring bank minus (mean) X-Efficiency of acquired bank(s) for
the last period before consolidation. Number of observed mergers: 243.
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 This result is somewhat more optimistic than previous studies for the cooperative sector (see Lang
and Welzel, 1995, 1996), which applied other frontier approaches and a smaller dataset.
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A positive efficiency difference could be interpreted as an indicator of an ex-ante incen-
tive for merging, because the better management quality of the acquiring firm should to
some extent be transferable to the acquired firm, thereby leading to post-merger cost
reductions in the merged bank (cf. Berger and Humphrey, 1992). It turns out, however,
that such ex-ante efficiency differences seem to play no major role for mergers among
cooperative banks. As illustrated in Figure 4, in about 47% of the 243 mergers the ac-
quired bank was more X-efficient than the acquiring bank. What we see instead looks
more like a random process combined with a tendency for more efficient acquiring
banks being involved in mergers where they enjoy an efficiency advantage and vice
versa.
In the next step of our analysis we calculate the size-effect indicator S-EFF for observed
as well as hypothetical mergers. Although the data indicate the existence of increasing
returns of scale - the traditional (ray scale) elasticity of cost with regard to an 1%-in-
crease of all outputs is about 0.95 -, there is no automatism between the external growth
of a bank and a positive size effect of such a merger project. The first reason for this
presumption is the non-neutrality of the branching network with respect to costs which
can be clearly inferred from Table A-2 in the appendix. Because German cooperative
banks are mostly located in rural areas and therefore use a relatively large number of
branch offices, these cost effects have to be taken into account. The second point to
mention are economies of scope, which may have a positive influence on the cost side,
if the output mixes match well, but may also worsen the performance of the merged
bank. Both determinants can reduce or even reverse the cost gains from economies of
scale. Note in passing that our measure of S-EFF excludes the influence of input prices
(recall equation (4)).
Table 3
Size-effects of observed mergers on predicted costs
S-EFF Mean Minimum Maximum
Mergers with
S-EFF < 0
no closing of branches 0.5% -4.4% 9.9% 37.4%
all acquired branches
get closed
-2.4% -10.1% 5.2% 88.1%
Size-effects represent scale as well as scope consequences of mergers. Number of observed mergers: 243.
Table 3 summarizes the results for observed mergers. If the acquiring bank does not
close any branches of the target bank, the size-effects of observed mergers range from
cost reductions of about 4% to cost increases of 10%. On average, total costs increase by
0.5% due to a merger. Only 37.4% of all merger cases provide cost savings due to a size
effect, if there are no branch closures. If we turn to the other extreme case -  all branch
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offices of the acquired banks are closed -, we find no evidence of dramatic cost
reductions due to the size effect of merging. On average there is a cost advantage of
2.4% compared to the pre-merger situation with independent banks. This cost advantage
has to be considered as an upper limit for at least two reasons. First, the closure of all
acquired branch offices will clearly be an exception, and second, because the implicit
assumption that closing branches will not reduce output levels is probably not realistic.
In the real world of cooperative banks, the acquiring bank does not enjoy absolute free-
dom in the selection of merger partners. Due to the principle of demarcation which is
still being upheld by the head association of cooperative banks, a cooperative bank
which wants to merge or acquire another cooperative bank is confined to its local or
regional neighbors as partners or targets.9 This important restriction raises the question
whether size effects from mergers would have been more favorable if others than the
observed mergers had taken place. To answer this question, we calculate size effects for
all hypothetical pairwise mergers and compare the results to the actual observations.
Figure 5
Size effect distribution for observed and for hypothetical mergers
Observed
Mergers
D
e
n
si
ty
Hypothetical
Mergers
-8% -4% 0% 4% 8% 12% 16% 20%
increasing
costs
decreasing
costs
S-EFF values on abscissa; no closing of branches. Number of hypothetical mergers: 430,115; number of
observed mergers: 243.
Our results are illustrated in Figure 5 where we plot calculated S-EFF values for ob-
served and hypothetical mergers against their relative frequencies. The cost changes for
                                                
9
 We know of no case where a cooperative bank acquires a bank which is not a cooperative bank.
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all hypothetical mergers cover the range from -7.9% to +19.9%. This is a much nar-
rower and more plausible interval than the range from -56.7% to +73.0% found for
mega-mergers by Altunbas et al. (n.y.).10 On average, our calculations for simulated
mergers predict a cost increase of 1.6%, which is slightly more unfavorable than the
value found for mergers actually observed (recall Table 3). Interestingly, in spite of the
geographic restrictions on external growth imposed by the demarcation principle, the
distribution of size effects for observed mergers is superior to the one for simulated
mergers, i.e., a random match of banks produces less attractive results than the actual
merger process. This can be concluded from comparing the densities in Figure 5. Note,
however, that the best simulated merger is by far better than the best actual merger and
that relative - as opposed to absolute - frequencies are depicted in Figure 5. In absolute
terms the observed merger with the most favorable size effect is ranked at number 548
out of 430,115 potential mergers, the second best is ranked at 661, and so on.
Let us finally turn to the ex-post performance of merged banks, i.e., the question
whether there exists a positive relationship between the difference in X-efficiency be-
fore the merger and the after-merger performance. For a graphical demonstration of our
results see Figure 6, where for all observed mergers the pre-merger difference in X-EFF
(„efficiency difference“) is plotted against the change in X-EFF („efficiency growth“).
As for the latter, we estimate the growth in X-efficiency from the acquiring bank to the
merged unit in a one-year comparison. Note that a merged unit is defined as a new firm,
because otherwise no jump in cost efficiency would be possible. To control for the in-
creasing trend in X-efficiency, the observed change is corrected by the corresponding η
term. After this correction, only 42.8% (the sum of field I and field IV) of the merged
banks showed an outperforming improvement in X-EFF, whereas 57.2% enhanced their
X-efficiency by less than the trend or reached even lower efficiency levels.
                                                
10
 In their analysis Altunbas et al. (n.y.) find on average important cost incentives for bank mergers.
Since they report extremely strong diseconomies of scale, the cost disadvantages of increased size
have to be overcompensated by extremely strong economies of scope which in our view is not very
is not very plausible.
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Figure 6
Ex-post performance of mergers
Field IV:
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Efficiency difference as X-Efficiency of acquiring unit minus (mean) X-Efficiency of acquired unit(s) for
the last period before consolidation. Efficiency growth calculated as X-Efficiency of merged bank in the
first period after the merger minus X-Efficiency of acquiring unit for the last period before consolidation.
Number of observations: 243.
More interestingly, from comparing field I to field II and field IV to field III we con-
clude that out of the 52.7% share of mergers in which an X-efficiency advantage of the
acquiring bank existed, less than one third (15.4% vs 37.3%) could sustain or even in-
crease the advantage of the acquiring bank. Apparently, the transfer of superior man-
agement quality to a badly managed part of a newly merged bank does not work well or
at least does not work quickly. If, however, the acquired bank was more X-efficient, as
was the case in 47.3% of all mergers, outperforming efficiency growth was more fre-
quent than underperformance or deterioration (27.4% vs 19.9%). Taking both results
together, our estimations suggest that a leveling off in efficiency differences due to
mergers seems more realistic than the notion of dominance of the acquiring firm for the
management quality of the merged unit.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we made a first attempt at analyzing the size and X-efficiency effects of
observed mergers in the German banking industry. We could base our empirical estima-
tions on data from 243 mergers among Bavarian cooperative banks during the years of
1989-95. We would like to emphasize that while cooperative banks dominated the re-
cent merger wave in German banking, results inferred from these mergers are probably
not transferable to the kind of mega-mergers in the offing.
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One of our main conclusions is that favorable size effects typically arise only if some or
many branches of an acquired banks are closed in the post-merger phase. This is in line
both with the reasoning of „Bayerische Vereinsbank“ and „Bayerische Hypotheken- und
Wechselbank“ which serve an almost identical geographical market and announced a
merger in July 1997 and with the fact that Germany is „over-banked“ in the sense of
having roughly twice the number of bank branches per person than other industrialized
countries (cf. Economist, 1997, p. 69). Comparing actual mergers to simulations of all
potential mergers we find that size effects of actual mergers are slightly better than the
size effects of hypothetical mergers. The principle of regional demarcation which forces
cooperative banks to pick only neighboring banks as partners therefore did not impede
the realization of size effects through mergers. We also conclude that pre-merger X-effi-
ciency advantages of acquiring banks are not the driving force behind the mergers ob-
served. As for post-merger performance, we find no evidence for ex-ante X-efficiency
advantages to transform into superior performance ex-post. Instead, our results point to
a leveling off in efficiency differences after mergers took place.
There clearly are quite a number of issues still open to discussion and closer examina-
tion. To name just two, let us mention first the fact that we dealt only with the cost side
of bank mergers. A complete evaluation of the merger process would also have to con-
sider the revenue side, in order to find out whether mergers increase market power (see
Lang, 1996, with results pointing in this direction). Second, one could ask whether a
merged bank needs a longer period of adjustment than the one presumed in our analysis
of post-merger efficiency.
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Appendix
Table A-1:
Parameters of the Cost Function
Variable Estimate Standard-Error Variable Estimate Standard-Error
σ υ
2 0.01020 0.00063*** 0.5 ln y1 ln y5 -0.00633 0.00570
γ 0.88588 0.00772*** 0.5 ln y1 ln y6 -0.00090 0.00064
η 0.03315 0.00566*** 0.5 ln y2 ln y2 0.10943 0.01542***
const 1.85347 0.10499*** 0.5 ln y2 ln y3 -0.00313 0.00367
ln w1 0.28374 0.04987*** 0.5 ln y2 ln y4 -0.04288 0.00736***
ln w2 0.02845 0.03506 0.5 ln y2 ln y5 -0.01108 0.00885
ln w3 0.68780 0.05867*** 0.5 ln y2 ln y6 -0.00211 0.00090**
ln y1 0.15832 0.02624*** 0.5 ln y3 ln y3 0.03056 0.00094***
ln y2 0.27306 0.04579*** 0.5 ln y3 ln y4 -0.03773 0.00252***
ln y3 0.20885 0.01434*** 0.5 ln y3 ln y5 0.00324 0.00300
ln y4 0.27385 0.02681*** 0.5 ln y3 ln y6 0.00011 0.00028
ln y5 0.08778 0.02684*** 0.5 ln y4 ln y4 0.10508 0.00491***
ln y6 0.03219 0.00345*** 0.5 ln y4 ln y5 0.00342 0.00517
0.5 ln w1 ln w1 -0.02383 0.02341 0.5 ln y4 ln y6 0.00104 0.00057*
0.5 ln w1 ln w2 0.00551 0.01082 0.5 ln y5 ln y5 0.01925 0.00308***
0.5 ln w1 ln w3 0.01833 0.02059 0.5 ln y5 ln y6 0.00016 0.00063
0.5ln w2 ln w2 0.00869 0.00704 0.5 ln y6 ln y6 0.00823 0.00040***
0.5 ln w2 ln w3 -0.01420 0.01075 ln br 0.03448 0.02386
0.5 ln w3 ln w3 -0.00413 0.02208 0.5 ln br ln br 0.02910 0.00591***
ln w1 ln y1 0.02159 0.00974** ln br ln w1 -0.00400 0.00685
ln w1 ln y2 -0.04447 0.01232*** ln br ln w2 0.01068 0.00477**
ln w1 ln y3 0.01048 0.00438** ln br ln w3 -0.00668 0.00683
ln w1 ln y4 0.00195 0.00797 ln br ln y1 0.00656 0.00469
ln w1 ln y5 0.02789 0.01009*** ln br ln y2 -0.02396 0.00682***
ln w1 ln y6 0.00330 0.00095*** ln br ln y3 0.01379 0.00211***
ln w2 ln y1 0.00947 0.00579 ln br ln y4 0.00036 0.00458
ln w2 ln y2 -0.00768 0.00969 ln br ln y5 -0.00119 0.00451
ln w2 ln y3 -0.00365 0.00295 ln br ln y6 -0.00041 0.00051
ln w2 ln y4 0.00048 0.00545 t -0.02715 0.00554***
ln w2 ln y5 -0.00454 0.00669 0.5 t t 0.00966 0.00051***
ln w2 ln y6 0.00147 0.00067** t ln w1 -0.00053 0.00192
ln w3 ln y1 -0.03106 0.00940*** t ln w2 -0.00426 0.00109***
ln w3 lny 2 0.05216 0.01331*** t ln w3 0.00479 0.00194**
ln w3 ln y3 -0.00682 0.00443 t ln y1 -0.00085 0.00100
ln w3 ln y4 -0.00243 0.00776 t ln y2 -0.00423 0.00145***
ln w3 ln y5 -0.02336 0.01173** t ln y3 -0.00037 0.00047
ln w3 ln y6 -0.00477 0.00097*** t ln y4 0.00183 0.00078**
0.5 ln y1 ln y1 0.11605 0.00829*** t ln y5 0.00206 0.00094**
0.5 ln y1 ln y2 -0.03986 0.00904*** t ln y6 0.00026 0.00010***
0.5 ln y1 ln y3 -0.01970 0.00269***
0.5 ln y1 ln y4 -0.04608 0.00515*** observations 5477
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Table A-2
Likelihood-Ratio Tests
Null-Hypothesis ln L Test Statistics Critical Value Conclusion
Complete Model -9260.5
Time-invariant inefficiency
( η = 0 )
-9234.5 52.0 6.63 Reject H0
No inefficieny
( γ η= = 0 )
-7621.9 3277.2 9.21 Reject H0
No technical progress
( f f g hi m0 1 0= = = = ,
i m= =1 2 3 1 2 6, , , , , )
-8515.8 1489.4 23.21 Reject H0
No influence of branches
( c c d ei m0 1 0= = = = ,
i m= =1 2 3 1 2 6, , , , , )
-8975.1 570.8 23.21 Reject H0
Table A-3:
X-Efficiency for Size Classes
total assets (million DM)
size class 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
total assets 0-25 25-40 40-60 60-80 80-100 100-
150
150-
200
200-
250
250-
350
>350
number of
observations
98 722 879 668 1012 588 382 455 361 312
mean 0.908 0.919 0.921 0.923 0.912 0.917 0.921 0.919 0.920 0.910
standard
deviation
0.090 0.051 0.048 0.045 0.052 0.045 0.038 0.038 0.041 0.061
minimum 0.575 0.725 0.733 0.758 0.354 0.682 0.800 0.798 0.699 0.602
maximum 0.997 0.998 0.998 0.997 0.997 0.997 0.998 0.998 0.997 0.997
Total assets in 1995 prices; X-efficiency averaged over years
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